记得以前有部剧，名字叫《篱笆女人和狗》，剧情一点也不记得了，但这部剧的名字倒是不容易让人忘掉。
今天再来学习一遍2013年巴菲特致股东的信中的经典段落--农场、地产和股票。
翻译：元宝，略有改动。
A. Farms，Real Estate and Stock
From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath than in our recent Great Recession.
In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.
A. 农场、房地产与股票
从1973年到1981年，美国中西部经历了一场由普遍的通胀恐慌引发，并由乡村小银行的放贷政策推波助澜的农地价格飙涨。随后泡沫破裂，价格暴跌50%甚至更多，这使举债经营的农民及其贷款机构损失惨重。在泡沫余波中倒闭的爱荷华州与内布拉斯加州银行数量，是近期大萧条时期的五倍之多。
1986年，我从联邦存款保险公司手中购入位于奥马哈市以北50英里处一座400英亩的农场。花费28万美元的价格，远低于几年前一家破产银行对该农场的放贷金额。我对农场经营一窍不通，但我有个热爱农业的儿子，从他那儿了解到这片土地可产出多少蒲式耳的玉米和大豆，以及相应的经营成本。根据这些估算，我推算出该农场的正常回报率约10%。同时我认为，土地生产力未来有望提升，作物价格也可能上涨。后来的事实证明了这两点判断。
学习笔记：
1、"the normalized return"指经过标准化处理后的投资回报率，常用于比较不同规模或类型资产的收益表现。在农场投资案例中，作者通过估算玉米和大豆的产量及运营成本，计算出10%的标准化回报率。该指标能消除规模差异影响，使不同投资项目具备可比性。
2、世上没有两个道理。
火借风势，风助火情，泡沫的产生也是如此。对通胀的恐慌，使农民觉得实业资产更有保障，而银行的高利贷助力了土地资产的泡沫，地价的不断上升似乎又使这种泡沫更五彩缤纷。等泡沫大到足以碰到那个等待的针尖，债务人和债权人均受到重创。
想起了我们目前的什么事没有？
3、巴菲特买入的价格，估算的收益率为10%，且未来有上涨空间。确定性。
I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.
我无需任何特殊的知识或智慧便能断定，这项投资没有下行风险，却可能带来可观的上涨空间。当然，农场偶尔会遭遇歉收，价格有时也会不尽人意。但这又何妨？总会有特别丰收的年份，而我永远不必迫于压力出售这份资产。如今28年过去，农场的收益已增长两倍，价值至少是我当初支付价格的四倍。我至今对农耕仍一窍不通，最近才仅仅第二次前往这片土地。
学习笔记：
1、极端的好运和坏运气是相互抵消的，终究要看正常情况下的收益。我原来觉得逢年过节的那些拜年嗑都是一些废话，其实也不然，努力后有可能会获得好的运气，等待，才会让那些美好的希望停留在原地。就像农场，经营好了就有一个不错的收益，不要让某一个年度的收成差影响整体判断。
2、确定性：农场的投资没有下行风险，却可能带来可观的上涨空间。这和我们在股市选择优秀企业时，虽然买入后会下跌，但下跌空间有限，而未来却有良好的回报可能，这才是该出手时才出手。
3、投资使用资金的长期性：不用迫于压力在某一时刻出售这份资产，有部电影叫《黎明前的黑暗》，要有能力等到好光景。
4、常识：无需任何特殊的知识或智慧，至今对农耕仍一窍不通--虽有自谦之意，但常识就是应该有却不见得有的能力。愿你我都能具备常识。
In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to NYU that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped — this one involving commercial real estate — and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.
Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant — who occupied around 20% of the project’s space — was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.
1993年，我又进行了一笔小额投资。我在所罗门兄弟公司担任CEO时的房东拉里·西尔弗斯坦告诉我，美国重组信托公司正在出售纽约大学旁的一处零售地产。这次同样是泡沫破裂的产物（此次涉及商业房地产领域）重组信托公司正是为处置那些因过度乐观的放贷行为助长市场狂热而倒闭的储蓄机构的资产而设立。
这里的分析同样简单明了。与当初的农场情况类似，该物业无杠杆的当期收益率约为10%。但由于重组信托公司管理不善，其收入在空置商铺出租后将会增长。更重要的是，占用项目面积约20%的最大租户，其租金仅为每平方英尺5美元左右，而其他租户的平均租金为70美元。九年后这份廉价租约的到期，必将显著提升物业收益。该地产的地理位置同样优越：纽约大学可不会搬走。
学习笔记：
1、泡沫的产生的破裂就是换了件衣服。
2、这个案例对照农场案例看，就像一部电影取了两个名字。
I joined a small group, including Larry and my friend Fred Rose, that purchased the parcel. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our original equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.
Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in the decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren. I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:
我加入了一个包括拉里和我朋友弗雷德·罗斯在内的小型投资团体，收购了这块地产。弗雷德是位经验丰富、信誉卓著的房地产投资者，他将与家人共同管理这处物业。而他们确实做到了专业运营（干得不错）。随着旧租约到期，收益增长了两倍。如今每年的分红已超过我们原始股权投资额的35%。此外，我们最初的抵押贷款分别在1996年和1999年进行了两次再融资，这两次操作带来的特别分红总额超过投资本金的150%。而我至今未曾踏足这处物业。
注：
这处纽约大学旁的商业地产买入后主要产生了三种收入模式：
1. 租金收入：这是最直接的收益来源。物业通过出租给商户获得稳定的租金现金流，随着旧租约到期、新租约按市场价重新签订，租金收入从最初的10%收益率逐步提升，最终达到年化35%以上的分红回报率。
2. 资产增值收益：物业本身的价值随市场行情上涨而增值。文中提到，通过专业管理团队的运营，物业价值持续提升，为投资者带来资本利得收益。
3. 再融资收益：通过抵押贷款再融资获取的现金收益。文中提到1996年和1999年两次再融资，带来了超过投资本金150%的特别分红，这是利用杠杆效应实现的额外收益。
这处物业的成功关键在于：买入价格低，地理位置优越（NYU旁）、租约结构优化（低价租约到期后按市场价重签）、专业管理团队运营，以及适时的再融资操作，共同构成了复合型收益模式。
未来几十年，来自农场和纽约大学房地产的收益很可能持续增长。虽然增幅不会惊人，但这两项投资将成为贯穿我一生乃至子孙后代的稳健优质资产。我讲述这些经历是为了阐明投资的若干基本原则：
学习笔记：
1、商业房产这笔投资，巴菲特是一鱼三吃，汤鲜味美。
2、农场和商业地产这两笔稳健优质资产，给人底气。
You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”
Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.
你并不需要成为一位专家才能获得令人满意的投资回报。但如果你不是专家，那么你必须认识到自身的局限性，并遵循一套确定能发挥合理效果的方法。保持简单，不要孤注一掷。当有人向你承诺快速盈利时，请迅速回答“不”。
要将注意力集中在你所考虑资产的未来生产力上。如果你对资产未来收益做一个粗略估算都觉得心里没底，那就放弃它，继续前进。没有人有能力评估每一项投资可能性。但全知全能并非必需；你只需要理解自己采取的行动即可。
学习笔记：
核心投资原则解读
这段话蕴含了几个关键的投资智慧，与巴菲特一贯的理念高度契合：
认识并坚守能力圈：投资者不需要无所不能，但必须清楚自己的能力边界。重要的是在能力范围内做出清醒的决策，而不是追逐每一个热门机会。
聚焦资产内在价值：投资的本质是关注资产本身能产生多少价值（即未来生产力），而不是试图预测其短期价格波动，后者更接近于投机。
抵制诱惑，保持简单：对所谓“快速盈利”的承诺说“不”，是避免陷入陷阱的重要一步。简单的策略往往比复杂的操作更有效，也更容易执行和坚持。
情绪管理的重要性：即使有了稳妥的知识体系，控制自己的情绪、避免因贪婪或恐惧而做出非理性决策更为关键。这需要克服人性弱点，例如避免追涨杀跌。
是不是你也想起了格雷厄姆在他的经典著作《聪明的投资者》，他在书中提到的：
“投资这件事有个特点，门外汉只需少许的努力和能力，便可以达到令人敬佩的结果；若试图超越这唾手可得的成就，便需要付出无比的智慧与无数的精力。”
If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.
With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field — not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.
如果你关注的只是打算购买的资产的预期价格变化，那你就是在投机。投机本身没有什么不当之处。但我知道，我无法成功地投机，而且我对那些声称能持续成功地投机的人持怀疑态度。所有抛硬币的人中，会有一半第一次抛能赢；但如果这些赢家继续玩下去，没人能指望自己总赢。而且，一项资产最近一直在升值，这绝不是买入它的理由。
在我的那两笔小投资中，我考虑的仅仅是这些资产能产出什么，完全不在意它们每天的估值变化。比赛的赢家是那些专注于赛场的人，而不是那些紧盯着记分牌的人。如果你能在周六和周日不看股价也安心度过，那不妨在工作日也试试这样做。
学习笔记：
投资与投机的根本区别
投资关注的是资产本身能产生多少回报（即“产出什么”），例如农场的作物收成、房产的租金收入。
对投机成功的怀疑：巴菲特明确指出，短期投机成功可能源于运气，如同抛硬币的胜负。但长期持续成功的投机极为困难，他对此持怀疑态度，并坦诚自己不具备这种能力。这提醒我们应对市场上所谓的“投机高手”保持警惕。When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”
切勿追涨：明确警告“资产最近升值绝不是买入的理由”，这直接反对了常见的“追涨”行为。因为价格上涨而买入，往往是情绪驱动，而非基于价值的理性判断。
关注内在价值，忽略短期噪音：“专注于赛场”意味着应关注影响资产长期价值的根本因素，如企业盈利能力、资产生产力。而“记分牌”则比喻资产的短期报价。真正的投资者应具备忽略每日价格波动的定力。
长期视角与心态：建议工作日也像周末一样不看股价，是倡导一种着眼于长期投资的心态，避免因短期波动做出非理性的决策，这与价值投资的长期持有理念一脉相承。
Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’s scathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)
My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following — 1987 and 1994 — was of no importance to me in making those investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.
总结宏观观点或是听取他人的宏观或市场预测，纯属浪费时间。事实上，这样做很危险，因为它可能会模糊你对真正重要的事实的视线。（每当我听到电视评论员轻率地预测市场下一步的动向，就会想起米基·曼特尔那句尖刻的评论：“你不知道这比赛有多容易，直到你进了那个广播间。”）
我的那两笔收购分别是在1986年和1993年完成的。在做出那些投资决策时，我对接下来几年——也就是1987年和1994年的经济、利率或股市会有什么表现毫不关心。我根本记不得当时的新闻头条或权威人士在说些什么。无论当时人们如何议论纷纷，内布拉斯加州的玉米总会继续生长，纽约大学也总会吸引莘莘学子。
学习笔记：
投资应聚焦于资产自身的内在价值和生产能力，而非无法预测的宏观环境。屏蔽市场噪音、关注资产确定性的“根本现实”、长期视角与确定性。
投机并不缺德，只不过发不财，也无法复制。
There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.
It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings — and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his — and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state — how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled wasabsurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.
我的两笔小投资与股票投资之间存在一个重大差异。股票为你持有的资产提供了每分钟都在变动的估值，而我的农场和纽约房地产至今都从未收到过类似的报价单。
对于股票投资者来说，那些剧烈波动的报价本应成为一种巨大的优势——对某些投资者而言，确实如此。试想，如果有个脾气古怪的家伙，他拥有与我农场相邻的土地，每天冲我喊出一个价格，说要买下我的农场或是把他的卖给我——而且这些价格在短期内会因他的情绪状态而大幅波动——那么，他那反复无常的行为对我来说怎么可能不成为一件大好事呢？如果他每天喊出的价格低得离谱，而我手头正好有些闲钱，我就会买下他的农场。如果他喊出的价格高得荒谬，我既可以选择卖给他，也可以继续经营我的农场。
学习笔记：
1、价格高得诚心离谱，可遇而不可求，遇到了我会卖掉持股。
2、如何能有源源不断的现金流？--思考。这很重要。
Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and often irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits — and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.
Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of “Don’t just sit there, do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.
然而，股票持有者常常会因其他持股人反复无常且常常是非理性的行为，导致自己也做出非理性的举动。由于市场上充斥着太多关于市场、经济、利率、股价走势等等的议论，一些投资者便认为聆听权威人士的意见很重要——更糟的是，他们认为应该依据这些意见采取行动。
那些拥有农场或公寓楼便能安坐数十年的投资者，面对不断跳动的股票报价和评论员们不断传递的隐含信息"别光坐着，做点什么"时，却往往会变得焦躁不安。对这些投资者而言，流动性（liquidity）就从本应绝对有益的特质，变成了一种诅咒。
学习笔记：
1、呆坐大法。
2、股市的报价及流动性都是有益的，不要让报价和流动性变成诅咒。
A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investorif he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.
During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And, if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?
"闪崩"或其他极端市场波动对投资者的伤害，不会比一个行为无常、喋喋不休的邻居对我的农场投资造成的伤害更大。事实上，对于真正的投资者来说，如果当价格严重偏离价值时他手头有现金可用，那么市场暴跌反而可能是有利的。在投资中，恐惧的氛围是你的朋友，而盲目乐观的市场则是你的敌人。
在2008年末发生的特大金融恐慌期间，尽管一场严重的经济衰退显然正在酝酿，但我从未动过卖掉农场或纽约房地产的念头。而且，如果我100%拥有一家具有良好长期前景的稳健企业，那么哪怕只是考虑抛售它，都是非常愚蠢的。那么，我为什么要卖掉那些只是参股了优秀企业的股票呢？诚然，其中任何一家公司最终都可能令人失望，但作为一个整体，它们必定会表现良好。难道真的有人相信，美国那些惊人的生产性资产和无限的人类创造力会被世界吞噬掉吗？
学习笔记：
1、金句频出。
2、农场、商业房产和股票的道理是相通的。
3、买股票就是买进了一家企业的一部分所有权。
When Charlie and I buy stocks — which we think of as small portions of businesses — our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings — which is usually the case — we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.
当查理和我买入股票——我们将其视作企业的一小部分——我们的分析方法与收购整家企业时非常相似。我们首先必须判断自己能否合理估算出该企业未来五年或更长时间的盈利区间。如果答案是可以，我们就会在股价相对于我们估算区间的下限而言定价合理时买入这支股票（或企业）。然而，如果我们缺乏估算未来盈利的能力——这通常是实际情况——我们便会直接转向其他机会。在我们共事的54年里，我们从未因为宏观或政治环境，亦或他人的看法，而放弃任何一项有吸引力的收购。事实上，我们在决策时根本不会讨论这些话题。
学习笔记：
1、买入股票——我们将其视作企业的一小部分——我们的分析方法与收购整家企业时非常相似。
2、首先必须判断自己能否合理估算出该企业未来五年或更长时间的盈利区间。
3、能估值就在估算区间的下限而言定价合理时买入这支股票（或企业），不能估值就放弃。
4、从未因为宏观或政治环境，亦或他人的看法，而放弃任何一项有吸引力的收购。
